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1. INTRODUCTION 
Charles J. Russo 
Ralph D. Mawdsley 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (Zelman) 1 , a closely divided 
United States Supreme Court upheld the voucher portion of the 
Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Programo The Court's five-to-four 
ruling generated six different opinions on the program2, under 
which students can attend private schools, including religiously 
affiliated schools, at public expense. In so doing, the Court 
afforded poor inner-city parents the opportunity to send their 
children to the schools of their choice. The Court also adopted an 
approach that could be characterized as more European in the 
sense that in brushing aside concems about the so-called strict 
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice O' Connor and Justice 
Thomas each wrote separate concurrences. Justice Stevens filed a dissent. 
Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
Justice Breyer' s dissent was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. 
Persona y Derecho, 50* (2004) 157-190 
158 CHARLES J. RUSSO / RALPH D. MA WDSLEY 
separation of Church and state, language that is not in the 
American constitution3, it placed primacy on the right of parents 
to chose where their children should be educated. 
Given the implications that Zelman raises, this artiele is 
divided into three major sections. The first part provides a brief 
overview of the legal history of vouchers in the United States. 
The second section examines the history of the Cleveland 
voucher program and ineludes an analysis of the judicial opinions 
in Zelman. The final portion reflects on the meaning of Zelman in 
the larger context of the Court's ever-evolving jurisprudence with 
regard to the nexus between the Establishment Clause and equal 
educational opportunities. 
Based on the Supreme Court's having invalidated a program 
that would have allowed academically gifted students to receive 
assistance with post-secondary education, in Locke v. Davey 
(Davey)4, this artiele focuses on students in elementary and 
secondary education. In Davey, a student who wished to study for 
a degree in ministry challenged his initially being denied a 
"Promise Scholarship" from Washington state. The scholarship, 
which was based on academic excellence and financial need, 
would have allowed him to pursue a double major in Pastoral 
Ministries along with Business Management and Administration 
at Northwest College, a Christian school. After the Ninth Circuit 
3. The metaphor of the "wall of separation" comes from Thomas 
Jefferson's letter of January 1, 1802 to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, 
and Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association. 16 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 281 (Andrew A., ed. 1903). Jefferson wrote: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God... 1 contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof', thus building a wall of separation between church and state. 
The Supreme Court first used the term in Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (rejecting a Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal 
polygamy statute). 
4. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
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reversed in the student' s favor on the ground that the state could 
not deny aid on the basis of religion, the Supreme Court 
disagreed. The Court struck down the program in decreeing that 
while it was permitted under the Free Exercise Clause it was not 
required under the Establishment Clause. In prohibiting the 
student from pursuing a degree that would have led to a career in 
religious ministry, the Court expressed its view that the State's 
interest in not funding the pursuit of such studies was acceptable 
because it placed a relatively minor burden on scholarship 
recipients. 
11. AN OVERVIEW OF LITIGATION INVOLVING 
VOUCHERS 
As American educational leaders looked to improve schools, 
they considered vouchers, a controversial approach to provide 
greater educational opportunities for students. InitialIy advocated 
as a form of market choice by Nobel Laureate economist Milton 
Friedman almost fifty years ago5, vouchers supporters recognize 
that since many public schools, especialIy in urban areas, are in 
need of repairs, vouchers might help, at least in inner-city 
schools6. 
5. Milton FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in Eco-
nomics and the Public Interest, 123-144, 127 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). 
According to Friedman: 
Governments could require a minimum level of education which they could 
finance by giving parents vouchers redeemable for a specified minimum sum 
per child if spent on "approved" educational services. Parents would be free to 
spend this sum and any additional sum on purchasing educational services from 
an "approved" institution of their choice ... The role of government would be 
limited to assuring that schools met certain minimum standards such as the 
inc1usion of a minimum content in their programs, much as it now inspects 
restaurants to assure that they maintain rninimum sanitary standards. 
6. After years of languishing, vouchers received a boost in John CHUBB & 
Terry MOE, Politics, Markets, & America's Schools (1990). See also, e.g., 
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Courts have reached generally unfavorable results in litigation 
involving vouchers. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 7 upheld the 
use of vouchers in a case from Milwaukee wherein the program 
inc1uded student placements in religiously affiliated private 
schools8. 
Conversely, the Supreme Court of Maine9 and the First 
Circuit 10 upheld a law from Maine that inc1uded nonsectarian 
schools but specifically exc1uded religiously affiliated schools 
from participating in a tuition vouchers program 11. The program 
provided vouchers for students whose school boards did not 
operate high schools. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Vermont 
affirmed the unconstitutionality of a state statute that would have 
permitted taxpayer support to reimburse parents for tuition for 
sectarian schools. The court wrote that "in the absence of 
adequate safeguards against the use of such funds for religious 
worship"12, the statute violated the state constitution. Further, on 
remand after an appellate court in Florida rejected a facial 
Isabel V. SA WHILL & Shannon L. SMITH, Vouchers for Elementary and 
Secondary Education, in Vouchers and the Provision of Public Services 251-
291 (e. Eugene Stuerle et al. eds, 2000). 
7. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
997 (1998). 
8. For a comprehensive, study of the Milwaukee program, see United 
States General Accounting Office, School Vouchers: Publicly Funded Pro-
grams in Cleveland and Milwaukee, GAO-01-914 (August 2001) (GAO 
Report). 
9. Bagely V. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 947 (1999). 
10. Strout V. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1" Cir. 571999); cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
931 (1999). 
11. For an earlier, unreported, case with a similar outcome, see Asociacion 
de Maestros de Puerto Rico V. Torres, 1994 WL 780744 (Puerto Rico, 1994) 
(striking down a program that would have provided a voucher of up to $1,500 
to defray educational costs for students to attend a variety of schools, including 
those that were religiously affiliated). 
12. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. V. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 
1999). 
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challenge to the constitutionality of a state voucher program that 
allowed students from public schools deemed as failing to receive 
scholarships to attend the private13 schools their parents 
selectedl4, a trial court struck the statue down on the basis that it 
violated the prohibition in state constitution on taking revenue 
from the public treasury in indirect aid of sectarian institutionsl5 . 
In the midst of the ongoing debate over vouchers, the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear an appeal in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris I6. It 
reversed the Sixth Circuit' s finding that the voucher portion of 
the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program, under which students 
could attend private, including religiously affiliated, schools at 
public expense, violated the Establishment Clausel7. Rather than 
examine the broader controversies and considerable educational 
literature and related debates about the educational efficacy of 
vouchers, the remainder of this article focuses primarily on the 
dispute in Zelman. 
13. The authors prefer the appellation non-publie when referring to sehools 
that are not state funded. However, the authors sometimes use the term private 
in this manuseript insofar as it is the term used in m0s.!: statutes, most notably 
for the purposes of this eornmentary, Ohio. '\' 
14. Holmes v. Bush, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), review 
denied, 790 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 2001). 
15. HOLMES v. BUSH, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug 05,2002). 
16. 234 F.3d 945 (6'h Cir. 2000) (Zelman 11), rehearing and suggestion for 
rehearing en bane denied (Feb. 28, 2001), cert. granted, Zelman V. Simmons-
Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), Hanna Perkins Sch. V. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 
976 (2001), Taylor V. Simmons- Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001). 
17. Simmons-Harris V. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(Zelman 1), aff'd Simmons-Harris V. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6'h Cir. 2000) 
(Zelman l/), rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied (Feb 28, 
2001), cert. granted, id. 
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111. ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS. 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In 1992 Govemor George V oinovich asked a panel of experts 
to investigate whether a voucher program could be implemented 
in Ohio l8. In March 1995 the Ohio General Assembly adopted 
the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program (OPPSP) in response 
to a "federal court order requiring judicial supervision and 
operational management of the [Cleveland school] district by the 
state superintendent" 19. 
Designed to assist children in the failing Cleveland public 
schools, the primary goal of the statute was to "provide for a 
number of students ... to receive scholarships to attend altemative 
schools, and for an equal number of students to receive tutorial 
assistance grants while attending public school..."20. Other 
portions of the law were designed to provide greater choices to 
parents and children via the creation of cornmunity and magnet 
schools. 
During the 1999-2000 academÍc year, Cleveland's ten com-
munity schools, typically referred to as charter schools elsewhere, 
which cannot have a religious affiliation and are operated by their 
own boards, had great independence from state mandates on 
hiring staff and curricular content21 . The Cleveland Board of 
Education also operated twenty-three magnet schools that 
emphasized particular subject areas, teaching methods, andl or 
18. Margaret A. NERO, Cornrnent, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring 
Program: Why Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 
58 Ohio St. L. 1. 1103, 1107 (1997). 
19. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975. See Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 
1274 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (approving a consent decree in Cleveland's school 
desegregation suit). 
20. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A). 
21. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3314.01 et seq. 
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services for students22. Cornmunity schools were allocated 
$4,518 per pupil, whereas magnet schools received $7,717, 
inc1uding state funding of $4,167, for the year, far in excess of the 
funds available to children and families participating in the 
voucher program23. Other than their discussion in Zelman, the 
portions of the statute that directed the state superintendent to 
provide selected students with tutorial assistance24 and that 
created the cornmunity and magnet schools have not been the 
subject of litigation. 
The first, and more controversial, aspect of the statute, which 
went into effect during the 1996-97 school year, provides 
scholarships for students to attend an alternative school of his or 
her choice defined as "a registered private school located in 
[Cleveland] or in a public school located in an adjacent school 
district"25. The selected private schools must be located within 
city boundaries26; must not discriminate "on the basis of race, 
religion, or ethnic origin"27 or "advocate or foster unlawful 
behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion"28; must enroll "a 
minimum of ten students per c1ass or at least twenty-five students 
in all the c1asses offered"29; and must "agree[] not to charge any 
tuition to low-income families participating in the scholarship 
program in excess of ten percent of the scholarship amount... 
[and] shall permit any such tuition, at the discretion of the parent, 
22. Zelman, supra note 2 at 2464. 
23. Id. 
24. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A). In a previous section, the statute 
defined "tutorial assistance 'as instructional services provided to a student 
outside of regular school hours approved by the cornrnission on school 
choice .. . '" O.R.C. § 3313.974(H). 
25. Ohio Rev. Code Ano. § 3313.974(G). 
26. Ohio Rev. Code Arm. § 3313.976(A)(3). 
27. Ohio Rev. Code Arm. § 3313.976(A)(4). 
28. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(6) 
29. Ohio Rev. Code Arm. § 3313.976(A)(5). 
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to be satisfied by the low income family' s provision of in-kind 
contributions or services"30. 
The OPPSP created publicly funded scholarships, the amounts 
of which "shall not exceed the lesser of the tuition charges of the 
alternative school the scholarship recipient attends or an amount 
established by the superintendent not in excess of twenty-five 
hundred dollars"31. The amount of a scholarship, or voucher, was 
to be prorated for any portion of a school year that a child does 
not attend a registered private schooP2. More specifically, parents 
whose "family income is at or aboye two-hundred percent of the 
maximum income level established by the state superintendent... 
shall qualify for seventy-five percent of the scholarship amount 
and students whose family income is below two hundred percent 
of that maximum income level shall qualify for ninety percent of 
the scholarship amount"33. The net result is that parents of low 
income students receive a maximum of $2,250 while other 
participants can receive up to $1,875. 
As an added safeguard, the statute calls for voucher checks to 
be made out to parents or guardians34 who were to endorse them 
before the schools could use the funds35. The voueher funds 
followed students regardless of where they attended sehooP6. 
The most complete report on the OPPSP, published by the 
Government Aeeounting Office (GAO), revealed dramatie demo-
30. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(8). 
31. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.978(C)(1). The statute also permits 
increases for students with disabilities. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.978(C)(3). 
Similarly, the tutorial assistance program proyides an amount that "shall not 
exceed the les ser of the proyider' s actual charges for such assistance or a 
percentage established by the state superintendent, not to exceed twenty per 
cent, of the pilot project school district's average basic scholarship amount". 
Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.978(C)(3). 
32. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.979(A)(2). 
33. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.978(A). 
34. Ohio Rey. Code Ann. § 3313.979(A)(2). 
35. GAO Report, supra note 8 at 5 
36. Id. 
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graphic data about program participants. This report indicates that 
during the 1998-99 school year, the most recent year for which it 
had complete data, 70% of farnilies with children participating in 
the OPPSP were headed by single mothers, with average family 
incomes of $18,75037; 73.4% of the children who participated 
were minorities and 26.6% were white38. 
Since its implementation, only private schools participated in 
the OPPSP39. The GAO Report reveals that approximately 3,400 
voucher students40 were enrolled in 52 private schools41 which 
received about $5.2 million in publicly funded payments for the 
1999-2000 academic year. During the same academic year, the 
Cleveland public schools had about 76,000 students in its 121 
schools and received $712 million in public support42. 
The Supreme Court relied on even more recent data than the 
GAO Report. Chief Justice Rehnquist' s majority opinion pointed 
out that during the 1999-2000 school year, 46 of the 56 
participating private schools were religiously affiliated and that 
96% of the more than 3,700 students, 60% of whom carne from 
families that were at or below the poverty level, attended 
religious schools43. However, when placed in the larger context 
37. Id. at 14 (Table 1: Characteristics of Cleveland Families with Students 
in the Voucher Program or Public Schools). The Sixth Circuit reported thai 
60% of these families were at or below the poverty leve!, Zelman l/, supra note 
17 at 949. 
38. GAO Report, supra note 8 at 14 (Table 4: Racial and Ethnic 
Composition of Cleveland Public School Voucher School Students, School 
Year 1998-99). 
39. Id. at 5. 
40. The Sixth Circuit reported that of the 3,761 students enrolled in the 
program, 3,632, or 96%, were enrolled in "sectarian schools". The court 
pointed out that at one point, "as many as 22% of the students enrolled in the 
program attended nonreligious schools". Zelman l/, supra note 17 at 949. 
41. The Sixth Circuit indicated that of the fifty-six schools participating in 
the program~ forty six, or 82%, were "church-affiliated". Id. 
42. GAO Report, supra note 8 at5. 
43. Zelman, SUpFa note 1 at 646. 
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that included children who enrolled in community and magnet 
schools, he viewed the 96% "as but a snapshot of one particular 
school year [since during] the 1997-1998 school year, by contrast, 
only 78% of scholarship recipients attended religious schools"44. 
Moreover, Rehnquist maintained that if one were to place the 
voucher program in the wider context of Cleveland's having 
1,900 students in cornmunity schools, more than 13,000 in 
altemative magnet programs, and 1,400 in traditional public 
schools with tutorial aid, the overall percentage of students 
enrolled in religious schools drops to under 20%45. 
B. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
1. Lower Courts 
The voucher program survived an initial challenge in state 
court when a trial judge granted the state's motion for surnmary 
judgment on the basis that since the aid to private schools 
participating in the OPPSP was indirect, the statute did not 
violate the Establishment Clause46. On further review, an 
intermediate appellate court reversed in asserting that the statute 
had the impermissible effect of advancing religion47. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of the 
OPPSP48. The court found that the statute as a whole did not 
violate the Establishment Clause since it passed muster under 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Gatton v. Goff, 1996 WL 466499 (Ohio Cornmon Pleas July 31, 1996). 
47. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. Ct. May 1, 
1997). 
48. Aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 
(Ohio 1999); hereinafter cited as Goff. 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman49, but did sever the section of the law that 
gave priority to parents who belonged to a religious group that 
supported a sectarian group. However, in deciding that the 
voucher program violated the state constitutional provision that 
requires every statute to have only one subject, the court struck it 
down. The court stayed enforcement of its order until June 30, 
1999, to avoid disrupting the then current school year50. The 
General Assembly of Ohio addressed the court's concems and re-
enacted the statute on June 29, 199951 . 
Dissatisfied at having lost in state court, and in light of the 
revised statute, opponents of the OPPSP filed two separate claims 
that were joined into one suit. A federal trial court in Ohio, 
relying largely on Committee for Public Educatíon and Líberty v. 
Nyquíst52, wherein the Supreme Court struck down a program 
from New York that, in part, provided tuition for low-income 
children whose parents wished to send them to religious schools, 
initially granted the injunction on the basis that the OPPSP 
49. According to this test: "Every analysis in this area must begin with 
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must 
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster "an excessive govemment entanglement with religion". Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (Lemon). 
Further, when addressing entanglement and state aid to institutions that are 
religiously affiliated, the Court took three additional factors into consideration: 
"we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are 
benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting 
relationship between the govemment and religious authority". Id. at 615; 
hereinafter cited as Lemon. 
50. Goff, supra note 47 at 216. 
51. Zelman 1, supra note 16 at 740. 
52.413 U.S. 756 (1973). The statute at issue provided direct money grants 
to qualifying nonpublic schools, defined as those that served a high concen-
tration of low-income students, to pay for the maintenance and repair of faci-
lities as well as for equipment to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of 
students; hereinafter cited as Nyquist. 
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violated the Establishment Clause53 . Two days later the court 
partially stayed its own order, for one semester or until it 
rendered a final judgment on the request for permanent injunctive 
relief, applicable only to students already taking part in the 
OPPSp54. The court was concemed that since its order was issued 
so close to the start of the school year, it might have had a 
disruptive effect on children. A divided Supreme Court granted 
another stay pending the final disposition of the Sixth Circuit55. 
About six weeks later, a federal trial court issued a permanent 
injunction, subject to the Sixth Circuit' s review, prohibiting the 
state from administering the voucher program56. 
A divided Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of surnmary 
judgment that struck the program down as unconstitutional since 
it violated the Establishment Clause. The program had the im-
permissible effect of advancing religion, the court said, resulting 
in governmental indoctrination of religious beliefs or creating an 
incentive to attend religious schools57. After reviewing precedent 
from Lemon through the Court's most recent aid case, Mitchell v. 
53. The two cases had the docket numbers CV 1 :99 CV 1740 and 1 :99 CV 
1818. Zelman 1, supra note 15. 
54. Stay granted in part, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 1999 WL 669222 
(N.D. Ohio Aug 27,1999). 
55. Stay granted, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 528 V.S. 983 (1999). The 
application for a stay was presented to Justice Stevens who, along with Justices 
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, would have denied the request. 
56. Zelman 1, supra note 17. 
57. Zelman /l, supra note 15. The majority opinion was written by Judge 
Clay and joined by Judge Siler. Judge Ryan dissented. For another Esta-
blishment Clause case involving the two judges in the majority reaching the 
opposite result, see Johnson v. Economic Development Corp. of County of 
Oakland, 241 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming a grant of summary judgment 
that the issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds on behalf of a Catholic school in 
Michigan did not violate the Establishment Clause because it passed the Lemon 
test). 
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Helms58, the Sixth Circuit followed the lead of the trial court in 
applying Nyquist since that case dealt, in part, with a tuition 
reimbursement program in which the majority of participating 
poor students attended "sectarian" schools. 
In reiterating that Nyquist controlled, the court focused on 
what it described as the factual similarities: both programs were 
for low-income parents who received tuition assistance/ vouchers 
that permitted their children to attend religious schools and there 
were no restrictions on how the funds are used for such items as 
"religious instructions or material s as easily as for erasers and 
playground equipment"59. The court rejected, almost out-of-hand, 
the state's claim that, in light of the statute's language, vouchers 
were a neutral form of aid. 
The court disagreed with the state's position: it held that the 
program lacked neutrality in that it discouraged participation by 
schools not religiously affiliated because nonsectarian schools 
had higher costs and public schools with average expenditures of 
$7,097 per child60 lacked a financial incentive to take voucher 
students since the law provided a maximum of $2,500 per pupil. 
The court concluded that since public, and most nonsectarian 
religious, schools chose not to participate in the OPPSP, the 
program had the impermissible effect of promoting sectarian 
schools. The court glossed over decisions of public and most non-
sectarian schools not to participate in the program as a function of 
their own choices, an issue at the heart of the Supreme Court' s 
analysis, rather than the operation of the law. 
58. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality upholding the constitutionality of 
Chapter 2's permitting religiously affiliated schools to use publicly funded 
educational materials); hereinafter cited as Helms. 
59. Zelman Il, supra note 16 at p. 959. 
60. Id. 
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In a dissent, Circuit Judge Ryan would have upheld the 
voucher program61 . After having rebuffed the majority's analysis, 
he identified the only issue before the court asevaluating whether 
the program had the "primary effect" of advancing religion. He 
thus criticized the majority for relying on Nyquist rather than the 
first two criteria of the modified test enunciated in Agostini v. 
Felton,62 and so presaged the rationale of the Supreme Court. He 
contended that the orily two issues properly before the court were 
to apply Agostini' S "impermissible effect" test to determine 
whether the effect of Ohio's voucher program is to advance 
religion, either because (1) the aid it provides results in go-
vernmental indoctrination, or (2) the program defines its reci-
pients by reference to religion"63. Although not reviewing Judge 
Ryan's dissent in detail, suffice it to say that he was content that 
the statute passed both parts of this test. 
As could have been anticipated, the State of Ohio sought 
further review. The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal to 
resolve the split between the Circuits and state courts64, 
upholding the constitutionality of the OPPSP. 
6l. Id. at 963 (Ryan, 1., dissenting). Judge Ryan joined the majority opinion 
in agreeing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify 
the question of collateral estoppel to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Judge Ryan is 
a supporter of religious freedom in a variety of contexts, such as in Coles v. 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (dissenting against striking 
down a school board's practice of praying before meetings). 
62. 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (upholding the on-site delivery of Title 1 
services for children who attended religiously affiliated non-public schools); 
hereinafter cited as Agostini 
63. Id. at 968 citing Agostini, id. at 234. 
64. Cert. granted, supra note 16. 
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2. Supreme Court Analysis 
a) Majority Opinion 
Writing for the Court in his thirtieth term of service on the 
High Court65, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his rationale by 
citing the Court' s most recent iteration of its Establishment 
Clause test in Agostini. The test asks "whether the government 
acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religions [and] 
whether the aid has the 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting 
religion"66. Noting the lack of a dispute over the program's valid 
secular purpose in providing programming for poor children in a 
failing school system, he turned to the question of "whether the 
Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing 
or inhibiting religion"67. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that in addressing whether a 
program has the effect of advancing religion, the Court has drawn 
a distinction between situations where the government provides 
direct aid to religious schools68 and situations involving parental 
choice, wherein public funds are used in religious schools via to 
the independent choice s of private individuals69. He noted that 
whereas the Court's perspective with regard to direct aid has 
evolved dramatically, its attitude toward true private choice, as 
65. For a news commentary to this effect, see Linda Greenhouse, Court 
Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. Times, July 2, 2002 
atA 1, 14. 
66. Zelman, supra note 1 at 648-649, citing Agostini, supra note 62 at 222-
223. 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., Helms, supra note 58; Agostini, supra note 62. 
69. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
(permitting the on-site delivery of the aid of a sign language interpreter for a 
deaf student in a Catholic high school); (Zobrest). 
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reflected in Mueller v. Allen70, Witters v. Washington Department 
of Services for the Blinál1, and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills 
School Districtn , has remained consistent. Taking these three 
cases into account, Rehnquist emphasized that as long as "a 
governmental aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance directIy to a broad c1ass of citizens who, in 
turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result 
of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program 
is not readily subject to a challenge under the Establishment 
Clause"73. 
Turning to the Cleveland Program, the Chief Justice stated that 
it was constitutionally acceptable because, as part of the state's 
far-reaching attempt to provide greater educational opportunities 
in a failing school system, it permits all city schools and adjacent 
suburban districts to participate. Further, he observed that the 
statute's only preference is to aid low-income families, and the 
program does not provide an incentive to religious schools, since 
"the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral secular criteria that 
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both 
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory 
70.463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction permitting 
parents to deduct part of the cost of tuition, transportation, and books) 
(Mueller). 
71. 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment did not prec1ude 
providing aid under vocational rehabilitation assistance program to a blind 
student who chose to study at Christian college to become a pastor, rnissionary, 
or youth director on the basis that the help was generally available without 
regard for the sectarian or non-sectarian nature of an institution), rehearing 
denied, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 475 U.S. 1091 
(1986); (Witters). The Supreme Court of Washington, in Witters v. State 
Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989), cert. denied sub nomo 
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989) later 
found that language in the state constitution prohibited the use of public funds 
for religious instruction. 
n. Supra note 69. 
73. Zelman, supra note 1 at 652. 
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basis"74. If anything, he found that the program created a 
disincentive to religious schools since they received only one-half 
of the per pupil aid allocated for community schools and one-
third of the assistance provided to magnet schools; suburban 
districts were eligible to receive double or triple the amount of 
per-pupil aid slated for religious schools. The program also costs 
parents who opt to send their children to non-public schools since 
they may have to supplement a small portion of tuition, not to 
exceed ten-percent of the "scholarship amount"75, while those 
who send their children to community, magnet, or traditional 
public schools pay nothing. In a footnote, the Chief Justice 
rebutted Justice Souter' s concem that the program was not neutral 
since voucher funds cannot be used at public schools: Chief 
Justice Rehnquist commented that the amount of aid allocatedfor 
children in public schools far exceeds that amount available to 
students who participate in the OPPSP76. 
Rehnquist easily rebuffed fears that even in the absence of a 
financial incentive, the program created "a public perception that 
the State is endorsing religious practices and beliefs"77. 
He posited that the Court has repeatedly recognized that 
reasonable observers would not think that a neutral aid program 
under which a genuinely private choice directs the assistance to a 
religious school involved govemment endorsement of the 
schools 78. Such afear is particularly misplaced in Zelman, he 
suggested, in light of the Ohio program' s history and context of 
service to poor children in failed schools; the program also offers 
a range of secular choices. He added that even though 46 of the 
56 participating schools are religiously affiliated, no constitu-
74. Id. citing Agostini, supra note 62 at 23l. 
75. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(8). 
76. Zelman, supra note 1 at 654, note 3. 
77. Id. citing Brief for Respondents Sirnrnons-Harris et al. 37-38. 
78. The Chief Justice relied on Mueller, supra note 70; Witters, supra note 
71; Zobrest, supra note 69; and Helms, supra note 58. 
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tional problem exists since the state in no way coerced parents 
into making a private choice for their children's school. 
The Chief Justice next responded to Justice Souter's concem 
that since most participating schools were religiously affiliated, 
private non-religious schools might be discouraged from taking 
part in the programo He was satisfied that this fact was of no 
concem because the rise of religious schools had nothing to do 
with the voucher program, since most non-public schools in 
urban areas are religiously affiliated. He pointed out that whereas 
82% of participating schools are religious, this percentage 
corresponds almost identically to Ohio's state-wide total, 81 % of 
non-public schools being religiously affiliated. He was convinced 
that if the Court were to place constitutional significance on the 
figures that Justice Souter relied on, neutral school choice 
programs might have been acceptable in one part of a state but 
not another, depending on the proportion of different types of 
non-public schools in an area. 
The Chief Justice almost summarily dismissed Justice Souter's 
argument that, even if the Court was not concemed that most 
participating schools are religiously affiliated, it should worry 
that 96%of scholarship recipients attended such schools. 
Rehnquist said that the Court treated similar data in Mueller and 
Agostini, wherein the vast majority of parents had children in 
religious schools, as irrelevant since the "constitutionality of a 
neutral educational program simply does not tum on whether, and 
why, in a particular area, most private schools are run by religious 
organizations, or most recipients chose to use the aid at a 
religious school"79. Rehnquist maintained that the 96% figure 
Justice Souter relied on is misleading. He observed that if one 
were to place the voucher program in the wider context of 
Cleveland's having 1,900 students in community schools, more 
than 13,000 in altemative magnet programs, and 1,400 in 
79. Zelman, supra note 1 at 658. 
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traditional public schools with tutorial aid, the overall percentage 
of students enrolled in religious schools drops to under 20%80. 
The Chief Justice advanced two reasons why the Sixth Circuit 
and voucher opponents misplaced their reliance on Nyquist. First, 
he explained that Ohio's program differed greatIy from the one in 
Nyquist. The New York statute prohibited participation of public 
schools, provided aid directIy only to private schools regardless 
of the amount that parents spent on tuition, and was designed 
explicitIy as an incentive for parents to send their children to 
religious schools. In distinguishing the two cases, the Chief 
Justice succinctIy ruled that the Ohio program did not inc1ude any 
of Nyquist's unacceptable features. 
The second distinction that Rehnquist focused on between 
Zelman and Nyquist was that since the latter was handed down, 
the Court has affirmatively answered the question of whether 
sorne form of public assistance can be made available without 
regard to the religious or non-religious nature of the institution 
that received the aid. ConsequentIy, he reasoned that Nyquist was 
not controlling in the present situation. 
In c1osing, the Chief Justice conc1uded that the OPPSP 
followed an unbroken line of cases supporting true private choice 
that provided benefits directIy to a wide range of needy private 
individuals. Thus, he reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit 
and, in so doing, upheld the constitutionality of the OPPSP. 
b) Justice O'Connor's Concurrence 
Justice O'Connor concurred separately since she not only did 
"not believe that [Zelman] marks a dramatic break from the past" 
but also because she wished to elaborate on the Court's 
discussion of the need to take parental choice into consideration 
80. Id. at 659. 
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when weighing "all reasonable educational alternatives to 
religious schools that are available to parents"81. As such, she 
analogized that the voucher program was not unlike a variety of 
publicly funded health programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, 
and educational initiatives such as Pell Grants and the Child Care 
and Development Block Grant Programs, all of which permit 
public, albeit federal, funds to reach religiously affiliated pro-
grams without any constitutional limitations. In reviewing the 
Cleveland program in sorne detail, she rebutted Justice Souter's 
arguments about how the Court has departed from its own 
precedent. Justice O'Connor ended her concurrence by reflecting 
that "1 am persuaded that the Cleveland voucher program affords 
parents of eligible children genuine nonreligious options and is 
consistent with the Establishment Clause"82. 
c) Justice Thomas' Concurrence 
Justice Thomas' powerful concurrence began by echoing the 
words of Frederick Douglass and the promise of Brown v. Board 
of Education83 in observing that "[t]oday many of our inner-city 
public schools deny emancipation to urban minority students ... 
[who] have been forced into a system that continually fails 
them"84. Recognizing the strong support for choice among blacks 
and other minorities85, he acknowledged that ten states have 
81. Id., supra note 1 at 663 (ü'Connor, 1., concurring). 
82. Id. at 676. 
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down separate schools, based on race, as 
inherently unequal). 
84. Zelman, supra note 1 at 676 ( Thomas, J., concurring). 
85. Justice Thomas wrote that "[j]ust as blacks supported public education 
during Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now support school 
choice programs because they provide the greatest educational opportunities 
for their children in struggling communities." Id. at 682. See also, e.g., Jim 
CARL, J. (1996). Unusual Allies: Elite and Grass-Root Origins of Parental 
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enacted sorne form of public1y funded programs to assist a 
disproportionate number of underprivileged urban students. 
Consequently, Justice Thomas wrote that a program involving 
religious schools would "appear unconstitutional only to those 
who would twist the ... Fourteenth Amendment against itself by 
expansively incorporating the Establishment Clause [, thereby 
c]onverting[i]t from a guarantee of opportunity to an obstac1e 
against educational reform [that] distorts our constitutional values 
and disserves those in the greatest need"86. 
d) Justice Stevens' Dissent 
In a brief dissent, Justice Stevens continued his unabated 
opposition to state aid to religious institutions87. In describing 
"the Court's decision as extremely misguided," he raised the 
hyperbolic specter of "religious strife ... in the Balkans, Ireland, 
and the Middle East...", fearing that "[w]henever we remove a 
brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and 
government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken 
the foundation of our democracy"88. 
Choice in Milwaukee, 98 Teachers CoHege Record 266-285 (1996) (docu-
menting support in the African-American community for Milwaukee's voucher 
program). 
86. Id. at 684. 
87. Id. at 684 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Since joining the Court, Justice 
Stevens voted against aid in aH Establishment Clause cases involving K-12 
schools: Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (opposing various forms of 
government aid to religious schools), PEARL v. Reagan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) 
(permitting reimbursements to non-public schools for maintaining educational 
records); Mueller, supra note 70; School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 400 (1985) (opposing a shared-time program); Aguilar v. Felton, 
473 U.S. 402 (1985) (prohibiting the on-site delivery of Title 1 services in 
religious schools); Zobrest, supra note 69, Agostini, supra note 62; and Helms, 
supra note 58. 
88. Zelman, supra note 1 at 686. 
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e) Justice Souter's Dissent 
Justice Souter' s dissent, which was longer than the substantive 
portion of the majority opinion, was joined by Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg,and Breyer89. He criticized the majority for departing 
from principIes first enunciated in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, wherein the Court decreed that "no tax in any amount... 
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions ... 
whatever form they may adopt to teach religion"90. In retracing 
the history of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
since Everson, Souter questioned whether the voucher program 
was either neutral or provided parents with free choice. After 
arguing that the Court rnisapplied its own law, he again raised the 
specter of religious strife over vouchers91 . In the c10sing words of 
his dissent Justice Souter mused: "1 hope that a future Court will 
reconsider today' s dramatic departure from basic Establishment 
89. Id. at 686 (Souter, J. dissenting). During his time on the Court, Justice 
Souter voted against state aid in all aid cases, Zobrest, supra note 69; Agostini, 
supra note 62; and Helms, supra note 58. Similarly, during her time on the 
High Court, Justice Ginsberg al so opposed aid in both cases in which she was 
involved, Agostini, id. 62 and Helms, id. As discussed at notes 118-120 infra 
and accompanying text, Justice Breyer is not always opposed to aid. 
90. Zelman, supra note 1 at 689, citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 16 (1947) (upholding a statute permitting parents to be reimbursed for the 
cost of transporting their children to nonpublic schools). 
91. Just as in Helms, supra note 58 at 902 (" ... the more generous the 
support, the more divisive would be the resentments of those resisting religious 
support..."), Justice Souter continues to raise concems over divisiveness that 
might arise due to aid: 
"Justice Breyer has addressed this issue in his own dissenting opinion, 
which 1 join, and here it is enough to say that the intensity of the expectable 
friction can be gauged by realizing that the scramble for money will energize 
not only contending sectarians, but taxpayers who take their liberty of 
conscience seriously. Religious teaching at taxpayer expense simply cannot be 
cordoned from taxpayer politics, and every major religion currentIy espouses 
social positions that provoke intense opposition". Id. at 2501. 
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Clause principle"92. Given the Court's evolving Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, it may be that the day Justice Souter hoped 
for has arrived, but did not end in the way that he would have 
wished. 
f) Justice Bryer's Dissent 
Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens and 
Souter93. He began by dec1aring . that although he joined Justice 
Souter' s dissent and substantia1ly agreed with Justice Stevens,' he 
thought it important "to emphasize the risk that public1y financed 
voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based social 
conflict"94. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Whether Zelman is, as President Bush95 and sorne com-
mentators are suggesting96, the most significant case addressing 
92. Ze/man, supra note 1 at 717. 
93. Id. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. In addition to language in Justice Stevens dissent, supra notes 87-88, 
Breyer's remarks echo the sentiments of Justice Souter who, in He/ms, supra 
note 58 at 872, n. 2, feared that "[t]he Court may well have moved away from 
considering the political divisiveness threatened by particular instances of aid 
as a practical criterion for applying the Establishment Clause case by case ... ". 
In the same dissent, id. at 902 he worried that "the more generous the support, 
the more divisive would be the resentments of those resisting religious support, 
and those religions without school systems ready to elaim their fair share." 
95. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush, in Cleveland, Applauds Court's Voucher De-
cision: President Says Court Decision Is Comparable to its Ban on Segregation 
in Schools, July 2, 2002 at Al, 15. Bush said: "The Supreme Court in 1954 
deelared that our nation cannot have two education systems ... [l]ast week the 
court deelared that our nation will not accept one education system for those 
who can afford to send their children to a school of their choice and for those 
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equal educational opportunities for aH children since Brown 
remains to be seen. Regardless of whether it ever reaches the 10ft Y 
status of Brown, Zelman has c1early made equal educational 
opportunities and choices more readily attainable to poor inner-
city parents and their children. 
The Zelman Court's reliance on basic precedent setting 
principIes of educational equity set forth in cases involving the 
Establishment Clause and the Child Benefit Test may make refe-
rences to Brown appropriate, albeit perhaps overstated. Com-
parisons between Zelman and Brown aside, the Court has firmly 
addressed the dismal record of the Cleveland public schools97. 
Finding that the voucher program satisfied the Establishment 
Clause standard it enunciated in Agostini, the Court afforded 
poor, typicaHy disenfranchised, parents a greater range of edu-
cational choice s for their children. It is nothing short of amazing 
that opponents of vouchers, the vast majority of whom 
undoubtedly have genuine choices about where their children can 
be educated, ignore the data in the GAO Report. According to 
this report, 73.4% of the children who participated in the OPPSP 
were minorities, 70% of whose families were headed by single 
mothers with average family incomes of $18,75098. If such urban 
who can't. And that's just as historie". See also Scott STEPHENS, Mark 
NAYMIK, & Susan RUIZ PATTON, President Hails School-Voucher Ruling in 
Cleveland Speech, The [Cleveland] Plain Dealer, July 2, 2002, Al, 4. 
96. See, e.g. , George F. WILL, Kids Win, Snooty Libs Lose, N.Y. Post, June 
28, 2002 at 29; John 1. MILLER, What's Next for School Choice, National 
Review online, June 28, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com. 
http://www.nationalreview.comlmiller/rniller062802.asp. 
97. The Ohio Department of Education (Dec. 15, 1999) reports, for 
example, that on its 2000 Local Report Card District Ratings, covering the 
1998-1999 school year, the Cleveland public schools failed to meet any of 27 
state mandated performance objectives. See also Will, id., reporting similar 
results. The Ohio Department of Education's 2002 Local Report Card, 
reflecting data for the 2000-2001 academic year, reveals that the Cleveland 
schools improved to meet four of their performance standards. 
98. See notes 36-37 supra. 
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parents are to help their children escape the vicious cycle of 
poverty, this voucher program may be their last best hope since it 
offers an opportunity to take their children out of a failing school 
system and place them in educational environments where they 
can succeed. 
Arguments from the dissent and media opponents99, likely to 
be followed by academic critiques 100, about the potential divi-
siveness of vouchers and fears of their having violated the Esta-
blishment Clause are little more than red herrings at best, and 
subtle forms of racial and religious bigotry at worst. Clearly, 
reasonable minds can, and do, differ over the appropriateness of 
vouchers. Yet, the dissent' s charges that public funds are squan-
dered on religious purposes verge on "Know Nothingism"101: 
their no so veiled accusations reflect that they do not fully 
understand the value of providing parents with choice ami/or 
know what happens in religiously affiliated schools. Their words 
can be interpreted as serving little other purpose than stirring up 
anti-religious sentiment. 
Two excerpts from the editorial in the New York Times the day 
after Zelman evidence its hostility both toward religion, par-
ticularly Roman Catholicism, and vouchers. The editorial feared 
99. See, e.g., discussion at notes 102-103 infra and Tom TEEPEN, 
Education Takes a Back Seat to Politics: Motivation behind School Vouchers 
Misdirected, Dayton Daily News, July 2, 2002 at A 6. 
100. For an example of a earlier, representative academic critique of 
vouchers, see Sheila SUESS KENNEDY, Privatizing Vouchers: The Politics of 
Education, Phi Delta Kappan, 450, 452 (Feb. 2001): "Louis Mahern, an 
Indiana Democrat who favors vouchers, notes that they allow Republicans to 
appeal to lower-middle-c1ass white resentments without overt racism and still 
offer something to inner-city African Americans". The data, reflected in notes 
36-37, infra and accompanying discussion, in the GAO report c1early refute 
such accusations with regard to Zelman. 
101. The Know-Nothing Party was an anti-foreign, anti-Catholic political 
party in the United States during the 1850s. For a discussion of this group, see 
Tyler Anbinder, Nativisim and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the 
Politics ofthe 1850s (1992). 
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that "[O]nce students enrolled in those schools, they are subjected 
to just the sort of religious training the First Amendment forbids 
the state to underwrite. In many cases, students are required to 
attend Mass or other religious services. Tax dollars go to buy 
Bibles, prayer books, crucifixes and other re1igious icono-
graphy"102. Such language, which c1early misunderstands what 
takes place in Roman Catholic schools103, for example, is remi-
niscent of Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Aguilar, later 
102. The Wrong Ruling on Vouchers, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2002, at A 26 
(emphasis added). The editorial's referring, perhaps unintentionaHy, to non-
pub1ic schoo1s as "those" is reminiscent of Cicero's use of the Latin equiva1ent, 
ille, in contemptuously and dismissively referring to his opponents. Oxford 
Latin Dictionary 827 (1982). In faimess, the newspaper printed a story re-
porting favorable reactions to Zelman. Jacques STEINBERG, Vouchers Backers 
See Opening for Wider Agenda, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2002 at A 24. 
103. For an earlier example of a symbiotic relationship between special 
interest groups that oppose to aid at least in part based on fright tactics that the 
Roman Catholic Church stands to be the greatest beneficiary, see Sheila SUESS 
KENNEDY, Privatizing Vouchers: The Politics of Education, Phi Delta 
Kappan, 450, 452 (Feb 2001) (reiterating "charges that the cooperation 
between the Catholic Church and holders of public office went beyond an 
acceptable political response to a valued voting constituency ... "). The selective 
criticism is interesting insofar as n voucher opponents who question the 
political motives of other groups ignore that fact that "[d]uring the 2000 
election, more than 66 percent of the NEA's [National Education Asso-
ciation's] political contributions went to Democratic campaigns" and candi-
dates who opposed vouchers. Ken W ARD, Editorial: Risky Schemes in Nevada, 
Florida. Las Vegas Rev. J., Nov. 29, 2000 at 11B; available, 2000 WL 
8216075. See also, Josetta SACK, Teachers Unions Pull Out Stops for Gore, 
Educ. Week, Aug. 17,2000 at 43; Jeff ARCHER, Unions Pull Out Stops for 
Elections, Educ. Week, Nov. 1,2000 at 1, 31, 33-34 (reporting that two of the 
NEA's polítical actions groups contributed aH but $11,000 out of $1.05 rnillion 
between January 1999 and June 2000 and aH but $40,000 out of $1.1 rnillion to 
Democratic candidates through late August 2000). See also People for the 
American Way, Five Years and Counting: A Closer Look at the Cleveland 
V oucher Program 7 (200 1) (questioning how vouchers might affect religious 
liberty). 
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trumped by Justice ü'Connor's majority opinion in Agostini104. 
In the absence of any allegation of inappropriate activity, Justice 
Brennan struck down the on-site delivery of Title I for poor 
children with identifiable educational needs simply based on the 
unsubstantiated fear of excessive entanglement. 
Despite the fears that funds may be misappropriated, in 
Zelman there were, and are, no aHegations of inappropriate use of 
resources for religious purposes. In fact, as a safeguard against 
such a possibility, tuition checks are sent to parents, who sign 
them over to school officials. Moreover, vouchers did not neces-
sarily cover either fuH tuition or the cost of educating each child; 
one can only wonder at voucher opponents' worry that religious 
schools might have diverted large portions of their resources to 
religious instruction or religious materials while continuing to 
provide a broader range of secular instruction. Even conceding 
arguendo, that a portion of funds may be used to purchase an 
occasional religious item, one wonders how schools would 
function if so much money were spent on religious artifacts 
instead of paying such mundane expenses as teacher salaries and 
heating bilIs. 
Fears about misuse of funds for religious "iconography" 
become even more baseless when one considers the cost of 
tuition in Cleveland' s Roman Catholic schools. The average 
amount of tuition and fees in Catholic schools in the Cleveland 
Diocese during the 1998-99 school year was $1,245 for aH 
elementary schools and $1,300 in its seven inner-city schools, as 
opposed to average costs per pupil of $1,916 for aH schools and 
$2,167 in the inner-city105. Given these figures, it is difficult to 
104. Justice Q'Connor laid the groundwork for her opinion in Agostini in 
her vociferous dissent in Aguilar, supra note 87 at 421 (Q'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
105. Diocese of Cleveland, Faces and Facts: A Look at Catholic Schools in 
the Diocese of Cleveland 1998/1999 (1999) at 7-8. 
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Imagme that these schools have much room for discretionary 
spending on non-essential, non-educational items. 
The New York Times editorial further betrayed the writer's 
anti-re1igious sentiments in suggesting that "[i]n the religious 
schools that Cleveland taxpayers are being forced to sponsor, 
Catholics are free to teach that their way is best, and Jews, 
Muslims and those of other faiths can teach their coreligionists 
that they have the truth on their side"l06. It is disappointing that, 
in a newspaper that ordinari1y and appropriately champions open-
mindedness and diversity of opinion, that the editorial writer 
would have such intolerance for religious freedom and for 
parental choice of impoverished inner-city residents. The editorial 
is all the more amazing when one considers that the under1ying 
issue in Zelman is an attempt to improve the quality of education 
for underprivileged urban children. 
The fears of voucher opponents notwithstanding107, the 
Court's permitting aid in Zobrest, Agostini, and Helms, did not 
and should not lead to the demise of public education, which 
serves the nation very well in all but a hand full of localities such 
as Cleveland; neither will the decision in Zelman harm public 
education. Sorne resources are directed toward religious schools -
the cost of the voucher program as of June 2000 was about $5.2 
million and the Cleveland schools had a total resources of $712 
million - but the direct impact is negligible. Critics ignore the 
fact that the existence of non-public "schools saves government 
106. Supra, note 102. 
107. See, e.g., Dan MURPHY, F. Howard NELSON, & Bella ROSENBERG, 
The Cleveland Voucher Programo Who Chooses? Who Gets Chosen? Who 
Pays? (2001) (American Federation of Teachers position paper opposing 
vouchers); Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Vouchers at 
the Supreme Court: America's Traditions of Church-State Separation Hang in 
the Balance (2001); People for the American Way, Five Years and Counting: A 
Closer Look at the Cleveland Voucher Program 7 (2001). 
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nearly $39 billion," because of differences in per-pupil costs108. 
Since the program funds voucher students at a lower level of per-
pupil cost than allocated for their peers in public schools, there 
should be no loss of resources for public education; there may 
even be additional funds. To the extent that the funds in Zelman 
are increased, should legislatures create larger, more generous 
and far-reaching voucher programs, it will be interesting to see 
whether they place limits on the amount of money that can be 
earmarked for children who attend religiously affiliated schools. 
If legislatures do not set a limit, it is likely that an additional 
round of litigation will ensue. 
In a related issue, if nothing else, Zelman has made 
educational consumers more aware of the per-pupil costs of 
educating children. It will be interesting to observe whether the 
debate on educational equity takes these issues into account amid 
the search for genuine school reformo One can only hope that 
opponents of vouchers and school choice will stop relying on the 
same tired arguments, often couched in Establishment Clause 
terms, about aid being diverted away from public schools. 
108. Joseph M. Q'KEEFE, What Research Tells Us About the Con-
tributions of Sectarian Schools, 89 U. Det. Merey L. Rev. 425, 428 (2001) 
citing per pupil costs of about $6,500 per pupil as indicated in the Digest of 
Education Statistics (2000), U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Edueation Statistics (T.D. Snyder C.M. Hoffman). Unfortunately, the article 
did not report the figure for non public schools. See also National Center for 
Education Statistics in the United States. Private Schools in the United States: 
A Statistical Profile 1993-1994 (1997), Table 1.5: Percentage of private 
schools charging tuition, percentage allowing tuition reductions, and average 
tuition, by level and affiliation: 1993-94, indicating that the average cost of 
educating a child in a non-public school was $3,084 as opposed to $5, 513 in a 
public school. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Lemon, supra note 48 
at 625. Speaking about "church-related elementary and secondary schools", 
Chief Justice Burger wrote that "Their contribution has been and is enormous ... 
Taxpayers generally have been spared vast sums of money by the maintenance 
of these educational institutions by religious organizations, largely by the gifts 
of faithful adherents". 
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Perhaps the debate will shift to focus on the substantive matter of 
outcomes and for ways to best provide urban rninority students 
with opportunities to excel, as Justice Thomas so powerfully 
described it, rather than remain mired in failing schools systems. 
The Court' s focus on parental choice may have a drarnatic 
impact of the role of parents who have longbeen overlooked by 
the judiciary in disputes with school officials. In many ways, 
Zelman is the ultimate manifestation of parent choice. Courts 
have repeatedly rebuffed parent efforts in the past109, couched in 
the language of the liberty c1ause to direct the education of their 
children or to make curriculum demands on public schools11O. 
Courts have been more disposed to use parent choice, not as a 
vehic1e to enhance their rights to education for their children in 
public schools, but as a means of justifying governrnent 
assistance to nonpublic schools, an activity not directIy related to 
parents and public schools 111. Zelman, for the first time, defines 
parent choice in terrns of empowerrnent to make meaningful 
educational decisions for their children. Parents now have the 
109. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a 
state law that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in any grade lower 
than the ninth); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that 
Oregon's compulsory attendance law, which required all students to attend 
public schools, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting Amish families to 
complete the education of the children in their community following the 
completion of eighth grade). 
110. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1986) (denying parental challenges to 
a reading series); Brown V. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d 525 (1" 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) (denying parental challenges to 
a mandatory highly explicit sex education program); CH. ex re!. Z.H. V. Oliva, 
226 F.3d 198 (3m Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom Hood V. Medford Township 
Bd. of Educ., 533 U.S. 915 (2001) (permitting the removal of a child's poster 
of Jesus from a class display and preventing him from reading a story with 
religious content to classmates). 
111. See, e.g., Zobrest, supra note 69; Agostini, supra note 62; and Helms, 
supra note 58. 
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possibility of directly accessing the resources necessary to enable 
them to choose an educational venue for their children. 
In upholding the OPPSP, the Court followed its precedent in 
Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, Agostini, and Helms, cases which not 
only relied on private choice but also reinvigorated the Child 
Benefit test. At the same time, the Court eschewed the Sixth 
Circuit's talisman-like reliance on the outdated Lemon test as 
applied in Nyquist. The Court thus may have laid to rest the 
unworkable Lemon test and Jefferson's often misapplied, 
metaphor calling for a "wall of separation"112, at least with regard 
to state aid to religious elementary and secondary schools l13. 
In further demolishing the "wall of separation," Chief Justice 
Rehnquist' s opinion, particularly in rebutting the dissent, did not 
indicate much concem that instruction occurred in religious 
schools. He was satisfied that the aid was limited to parents who 
had access to a variety of schools, but exercised individual 
choices in sending their children to religious institutions. 
Moreover, since sorne public, and nonsectarian private, schools 
opted out of participation in the OPPSP and since the funds are 
earmarked for tuition, the Court had little difficulty in upholding 
the statute's constitutionality since it was able to avoid excessive 
entanglement. 
As polarized as the Court continues to be on a wide array of 
educational and non-educational issues such as state aid to 
religious schools114, drug testing of students115, the death 
112. See note 3 supra. 
113. The Court continues to maintain a wall of separation with regard to 
prayer at school activities. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000) (striking down prayer at a public high school football game); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting prayer at a public school gra-
duation ceremony). 
114. See discussions of Zelman and preceding cases throughout this 
commentary . 
115. Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls, 
122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002) (upholding, by a 5-4 margin, random drug test of 
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penalty116, and treatment programs for sexual abusers117, a final 
noteworthy development in Zelman relates to the role of Justice 
Breyer. Usually viewed as a liberal, along with Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsberg, his status in that camp, with regard to 
religion, has been uncertain. For example, prior to dissenting in 
Zelman, Justice Breyer had joined the majority in Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, joined Justice Q'Connor's 
concurrence in Mitchell v. Helms, and concurred separately in 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School1l8. Yet, this term he 
joined the conservative core of Chief Justice Rehnquist along 
with Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well as Justice Kennedy in 
upholding random drug testing of students who wish to 
participate in extracurricular activities in Earls. It will be worth 
continuing to observe Justice Breyer to see whether he becomes 
more of a swing vote. 
In the wake of Zelman, three important reminders are in order. 
First, as in Davey, states are, of course, not obligated to adopt 
voucher programs or similar approaches that aid students who 
pursue religious studies. Second, since Cleveland's voucher 
program was part of a larger initiative inc1uding magnet and 
cornmunity schools, reform efforts elsewhere should adopt such a 
broad-based approach. Third, states that do adopt programs like 
the one in Zelman will need to target similar disenfranchised 
students who wish to participate in extracurricular activities; the dissenters 
were Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg). 
116. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2002) (holding, by a 6-3 margin that 
the execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment; the 
dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas). 
117. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (holding, by a 5-4 margin that a 
prison program requireing an individual to admit to having committed earlier 
offenses does not amount to self-incrimination; the dissenters were Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
118. 533 U.S. 98, 127 (2001), Breyer, J. concurring in part (upholding the 
right of a religious group to use facilities in a public school after classes 
ended). 
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populations if they are to withstand challenges at least in federal 
courts119. Put another way, despite the fears of critics to the 
contrary, Zelman is highly unlikely to open the door to make 
voucher programs available to middle and upper class suburban 
families who wish to send their children to non-public schools at 
public expense. Rather, vouchers must be seen for what they are: 
an attempt to provide an altemative for poor, typically minority 
children to escape failing urban schools. 
Following Zelman, the challenge rests squarely on the 
shoulders of state law makers, especially those in urban settings, 
who will have to convine e their colleagues and educational 
leaders in suburban districts and private nonsectarian schools to 
end their boycott of the voucher programo Educational leaders 
will need to join forces to afford a wider range of equitable 
educational opportunities for underprivileged urban children. If 
legislatures are truly interested in providing for all children, they 
will work with educational and cornmunity leaders to consider 
such incentives as increasing the amount of vouchers, or at least 
prorating them to encourage reca1citrant schools and districts to 
participate in such a worthy effort. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Zelman has taken a large step toward giving poor parents a 
genuine choice in making one of the most important decisions of 
their lives, and those of their children, in being able to select 
where their sons and daughters will attend elementary and 
secondary schooL By affording parents the ability to make real 
119. Insofar as states typically have greater restrictions on whether public 
funds may be spent in religious schools, it is uncertain what would occur in 
such a venue. See, e,g., Witters, supra note 71, wherein, on remand the 
Supreme Court of Washington ruled that language in the state constitution 
prohibited the use of public funds for religious instruction. 
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choice s for their children, the Court may have done more than it 
can realize in helping to provide a true hope for the future for 
untold numbers of underprivileged urban students. 
